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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE SALTAS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
DAV!D A. AFFLECK, doing business 




Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 6190 
PETITION OF KENNETH BUTTE, ONE OF THE 
DEFENDANTS HEREIN, FOR REHEARING 
IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF 
PETITION 
Comes now Kenneth Butte, appellant herein, and 
petitions this Honorable Court to grant a rehearing of 
the above cause for the following reasons: 
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1. That it appears from the opinion and concurring 
opinions herein that the court overlooked the fact that 
appellant had settled a wayside bill of exceptions con-
sisting of the entire record of the first trial and that such 
record was abstracted in this appellant's abstract of 
record, pages 3 to 29, inclusive, with complete record of 
settlement thereof at pages 131 to 133, inclusive of said 
abstract. 
2. That while this Honorable Court correctly states 
the rule to be that "a new trial may be granted upon the 
court's own motion 'when there has been such a plain 
disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court or 
the evidence in the case as to satify the court that the 
verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such 
instructions or under the influence of passion or preju-
dice,' " and further correctly held that "the amount the 
plaintiff might have received from the deceased was 
speculativ~," and further held that "the amount of the ver-
dict is a matter exclusively for the jury" and that "on the 
ground of inadequacy of the verdict alone, the court 
may not interfere with the jury's verdict," and further 
held that "it is seldom that the amount of the verdict, 
standing alone, is so inadequate or excessive as to in-
dicate passion or prejudice," it was, nevertheless, held 
that the trial court could grant a new trial even though 
there was no showing of passion or prejudice and even in 
the total absence of showing that the verdict was rendered 
under a misapprehension of instructions or evidence. 
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3. That while the record on the first trial, contained 
in appellant's wayside hill of exceptions and in the 
abstract and briefs of plaintiff, George Saltas, discloses 
no error and the fact is that the only argument in sup-
port of a new trial as against this appellant was based 
upon (a) a quotient verdict, and (h) inadequacy of the 
verdict, and the trial court, after hearing the sworn 
testimony of the jurors, Haddow and Kiepe, held that 
there was no quotient verdict (Dft. Ah. p. 28), and al-
though the court was only "inclined to think at this 
time that the verdict is too low" hut was uncertain as 
to whether he would "find it too low" (Dft. Ah. p. 28), 
yet this Honorable court, contrary to the correct rules 
set forth in its opinion and supported by all of the author-
ities under statutes similar to those of Utah, permits the 
order granting the new trial to stand by refusing to order 
a reinstatement of the original verdict. 
4. That while the evidence on the first trial would 
have justified a verdict for the defendant, and the proof 
of damages (Dft. Ah. pp. 18 to 20, inclusive) would 
have sustained a purely nominal verdict, and while the 
authorities set forth in the brief of appellant (Brief of 
Appellant, Kenneth Butte, pp. 6 to 26, inclusive) clearly 
sustain the fact that the verdict was not inadequate, yet 
this Honorable Court, after correctly stating the rules 
applicable to the. facts, and after correctly pointing out 
that plaintiff's damage "was speculative," and without 
plaintiff's counsel either in his abstract or brief justify-
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ing the granting of the new trial, failed to set aside the 
order granting the same. 
5. That the opinion and decision of this Honorable 
Court is not justified by the record or by the law but is 
contrary to the record duly filed in this court and is con-
trary to the opinion of the court and the authorities sup-
porting the position of this appellant. 
It is believed that a reconsideration of the question 
of damages and of the granting of the new trial solely 
upon the claimed insufficiency of the verdict will result 
in this Honorable Court determining (1) that "the amount 
the plaintiff might have received from the deceased was 
speculative" and under all the circumstances a verdict of 
$800.00 was not inadequate; (2) that there was no show-
ing, or even any contention by plaintiff "that the verdict 
was rendered under a misapprehension of such instruc-
tions or under the influence of passion or prejudice;" 
(3) that the record (Dft. Ab. p. 28) clearly shows that there 
were only two questions raised and considered by coun-
sel and the court on the granting of the new trial, and 
the court, neither in its statement following the argu-
ments nor in its conditional order, indicated that there 
was any error of law or suggestion of passion or preju-
dice or misapprehension of the court's instruction; {4) that 
the trial judge misconceived his duty and erroneously 
believed he could disregard the jury's finding of damages 
and set up his own ideas against the unanimous verdict 
of eight jurors on the first trial and, as it subsequently 
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5 
developed, against at least two of the jurors upon the 
second trial. 
It is submitted that not only in justice to the rights 
of this appellant, but as a guide to trial courts in future 
cases and to promote and aid the administration of justice, 
this court should clearly define the duties of the trial 
court as applied to the record in this case and correct 
erroneous implications to be deduced from the present 
opinion under the facts disclosed by the record. 
RALPH T. STEW ART, 
GERALD IRVINE, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kenneth Butte. 
CERTIFICATE 
I, RA.LPH T. STEWART, do hereby certify that I 
am one of the attorneys for the appellant and petitioner, 
Kenneth Butte, and that in my opinion there is good 
reason to believe the judgment in the above entitled 
cause, and the decision of the Supreme Court insofar as 
it affirms the order granting the new trial herein, is 
erroneous and that the cause to that extent ought to be 
re-examined. 
RALPH T. STEW ART. 
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b 
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT 
This defendant, Kenneth Butte, settled his wayside 
hill of exceptions, consisting of the entire record on the 
first trial, plaintiff's motion for a new trial, defendant's 
motion to set aside the conditional order granting a new 
trial and defendant's motion to set aside the second 
verdict and reinstate the first verdict. (Dft. Ah. pp. 15 
to 30, inclusive, and 131 to 137, inclusive). 
Appellant, Kenneth Butte, (Dft. Ah. pp. 16 to 28, in-
clusive) clearly showed that the evidence would have 
justified a defendant's verdict and that the plaintiff's 
testimony (Dft. Ah. pp. 18 to 20, inclusive) would have 
justified a purely nominal verdict. 
In presenting his motion for a new trial, plaintiff's 
principal contention was that there was a quotient ver-
dict. Affidavits and counter-affidavits were filed and evi-
dence was presented in open court by jury foreman, 
Werner Kiep~, and juror, John Haddow. Their testi-
mony was conclusive that there was no quotient verdict, 
and the court said (Dft. Ah. 28): "So far as the quotient 
verdict is concerned I am inclined to hold aganist Mr. 
Metos." In commenting on the insufficiency of the verdict 
(the only other question argued) the court was not satis-
fied that the verdict was insufficient hut said (Dft. Ab. 
28): "I do not mean to say by that that I will find it 
too low." Had the court, after hearing the evidence and 
being famil~ar with the instructions given and other pos-
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1 
sihle errors, felt that there had been any misapprehension 
of his instructions to the jury, or had he believed that 
the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice, he 
would have made his position in that respect clear and 
mentioned any occurrence during the trial or delibera-
tions of the jury or testimony of the jurors at the time 
of the hearing of the motion, and made record of the 
fact that he believed the jurors had been improperly 
actuated or that some error had been committed or that 
the instructions or the evidence had been misunderstood 
or misapplied. On the contrary, the court held that there 
was no quotient verdict; that there was no evidence to 
go to the jury as against the defendant, Affleck, but 
that "he was inclined to think that the verdict was 
too low." 
There is no logical reason under our statute, and cer-
tainly no appellate decision under a statute similar to 
that of Utah, to justify the court in invading the province 
of the jury and directly or indirectly increase the amount 
of the verdict. This court has repeatedly held that the 
jury is the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility 
of the witnesses. It is disclosed in appellant's abstract, and 
was even more apparent in open court, that the evidence 
of plaintiff on the question of damages was unsatifactory 
and subject to question as to its credibility. The jury 
could have justifiably concluded that plaintiff's testi-
mony relating to pecuniary loss was not worthy of belief 
and that probably the other sons of plaintiff had helped 
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8 
to support him while deceased had lived for months away 
from home and passed the financial burden to plaintiff's 
other sons, Paul and Pete, earning between them $8.65 
a day. 
We ask the court to again review the authorities at 
pages 12 to 26 of the brief of appellant, Kenneth Butte. 
Defendant's abstract, page 28, discloses that the ap-
plication for a new trial was based on "inadequate dam-
ages appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice." No contention to that effect was 
ever asserted. vVe pointed out to this court in the brief of 
appellant, Kenneth Butte, page 27, that the statutes make 
no provision for the granting of a new trial upon the 
sole basis of "inadequate damages." We further pointed 
out that a new trial may only be granted "when there 
has been a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions 
of the court, or the evidence in the case, as to satisfy 
the court that the verdict was rendered under a mis-
apprehension of such instructions or under the influence 
of passion or prejudice." No such contention was ever 
or could be made by plaintiff. 
Our purpose in settling the wayside bill of excep· 
tions, and particularly in setting forth in our abstract, 
page 27, the statement of the court at the conclusion of 
the arguments on the motion for a new trial, was to make 
perfectly clear to this court that plaintiff did not contend 
that there was a disregard of instructions or of evidence, 
hut, on the contrary, no such contention was asserted by 
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9. 
plaintiff's counsel or considered by the court. The record 
repudiates any finding to the contrary. 
The opinion of this court, concurred in by Justices 
Larson and Pratt, correctly states the rule under our 
statute and under the statutes in other states identical or 
similar to ours. It is undoubtedly true as this court states 
"that the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively 
for the jury," when inadequacy only is relied upon. It 
is likewise true, as the opinion states, "on the ground of 
inadequacy of the verdict alone, the court may not inter-
fere with the jury's verdict." It is also the rule, as stated 
in the opinion, that ••it is seldom that the amount of the 
verdic~ standing alone, is so inadequate or excessive as 
to indicate passion or prejudice" and ••in order to elimin-
ate speculation as to the basi~ of the exercise of judicial 
discretion in granting new trials, the record should show 
the reasons and make it clear the court is not invading 
the province of the jury." 
The trial court, in granting the new trial in this 
case, not only failed to ••indicate wherein there was a 
plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the 
court or the evidence or what constituted bias or preju-
dice on the part of the jury" hut, by his statement fol-
lowing the arguments, affirmatively showed that no error 
of court or jury was relied on but that he was merely 
expressing his own personal views concerning the amount 
as opposed to the jury's finding. In other words, the trial 
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judge not only failed to make clear any reasons justify-
ing an inference of disregard on the part of the jury, 
hut expressed, inferentially at least, that there was no 
failure on the part of the jury to do anything other than 
fail to return a verdict of a size which the court would 
have found had the trial been to the court. 
The prevailing opinion suggests that "it may be 
there was sufficient in the record of the former trial to 
justify the trial court in concluding the jury had disre-
garded or misconceived the instructions given or the evi-
dence." If such he the case why did plaintiff's counsel 
not argue to the trial court the record justifying such 
conclusion? If such he the case why did the trial court 
not point out such record or comment on it either in 
his statement from the bench following the arguments or 
in his conditional order increasing the verdict? If such be 
the case why did not plaintiff's counsel either in his brief 
or in his argument to this court point out from the record 
or otherwise justify a conclusion that the jury disre-
garded or misconceived the instructions or the evidence? 
The entire record is before this court. Appellant, 
Kenneth Butte, takes the position that upon submission 
of such record and a showing that no questions of passion 
or prejudice or disregard of instructions or evidence were 
pointed out or argued either to the trial court or to this 
court, and in pointing out that on the contrary the trial 
court did not in any way consider such questions, has 
cast the burden upon the plaintiff to establish that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
trial court in fact based his ruling upon some grounds 
justifying his judicial right to interfere with the jury's 
verdict. 
Damages in the sum of $800.00 under the facts in 
this case are not sufficiently inadequate "to cause the 
court to think the verdict was the result of bias or preju-
dice." Probably no two of twenty lawyers, or twenty 
judges, or twenty jurors, would ever arrive at the same 
verdict. One judge, on the same evidence, might feel that 
an $800.00 verdict was excessive, while another might 
argue that a $2400.00 verdict was inadequate. One judge 
might say that when deceased's father testified that "de-
ceased was the only one who helped and was his sole sup-
port," although admitting on cross-examination that he 
himself earned $4.25 a day and that two other sons earned 
$5.00 and $3.65 a day, respectively, was falsifying, while 
another judge might believe such testimony. As a matter 
of fact plaintiff did in important respects vary substan-
tially from the truth in testifying concerning financial 
assistance and approached the truth only when confronted 
with information from his employer that rental and other 
expenses were deducted from the pay checks of a son 
other than deceased. 
The jury sitting on the first trial was composed of 
several level headed, intelligent businessmen, including 
Mr. Kiepe, former secretary of the Real Estate Board. 
These jurors saw through plaintiff's effort to make it 
appear that deceased was the sole financial contributor. 
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They appreciated that deceased had helped financially 
until Paul and Pete had secured positions and become 
able to take over the burden which their elder brother 
had carried long enough and enable him to purchase an 
automobile, take a trip to California and, at the age of 
thirty, be free to plan on marriage. These jurors evidently 
appreciated that the amount, if any, which deceased 
would have contributed in the future was purely prob-
lematical and, as this court says, "speculative" and, in 
view of plaintiff's own earnings and earnings of Paul 
and Pete, it was unlikely deceased would have continued 
even with such questionable support as he had given 
his father in the past. No special damages of any kind 
were pleaded or proved. 
Under these circumstances, and with a total absence 
of any contention that the verdict was the result of preju-
dice or passion, and without any contention that there was 
any misapprehension by the jury of the instructions or 
the evidence, we again urgently insist that the trial court 
erroneously undertook to set up his feelings or opinion as 
against those of the jurors and invaded the province of 
the jury in its exclusive right to determine the credibility 
of the witnesses and the effect of all the evidence. 
If the action of the Honorable Trial Judge, mis-
takenly taken by him in this case, is sustained, it means, 
as we firmly believe, that a trial court may in any case, 
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13 
regardless of the facts, grant a new trial if he is "inclined 
to think that the verdict is too low." 
We respectfully urge the court to read the testimony 
of plaintiff (Pff. Tr. pp. 322 to 342, inclusive) on the first 
trial (Dft. Ah. pp. 18 to 20, inclusive); also plaintiff's 
testimony on the second trial (Dft. Tr. pp. 133 to 252, 
inclusive; Dft. Ah. pp. 71 to 85, inclusive). Plaintiff first 
testified that deceased was the only one that helped. He 
testified that all the rent was paid by or charged to de-
ceased. He testified that deceased lived at home all the 
time. He later testified on cross-examination that Spero 
lived at Cyprus Hall for several months. He later testi-
fied that Paul paid the rent; that since 1935 the rent was 
turned to Paul. He also admitted (Dft. Ah. 76) that Utah 
Copper charged the rent to Paul's check. He also ad-
mitted (Dft. Ah. 77) that the coal was deducted from 
Spero's check and the rent from Paul's, so, in fact, as 
early as 1937 Paul was paying the largest expense item. 
Plaintiff did not remember how long deceased lived at 
Cyprus Hall. He was sure deceased did not live there 
from April 1, 1935, to March 10, 1936, "because I don't 
remember so long." Many things plaintiff could not or 
did not want to remember. In view of such testimony was 
it not for the jury to determine whether plaintiff should 
he believed on the question of damages? Was the pecun-
iary loss, if any, not peculiarly for the determination of 
the jury, particularly in view of plaintiff's age, the exist-
ence of several other children, the fact that plaintiff was 
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regularly employed and had two surviving sons regu-
larly employed? 
WHEREFORE, we respectfully pray that this court 
grant appellant, Kenneth Butte, the right to orally pre-
sent this petition for rehearing and that a reconsidera-
tion and rehearing be granted him. 
RALPH T. STEWART, 
GERALD IRVINE, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Kenneth Butte. 
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